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BOOK REVIEW
Courts, Congress, and the Constitutional
Politics of Interbranch Restraint
COURTS AND CONGRESS.

By Robert A. Katzmann. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

Institution Press, Governance Institute, 1997) Pp. xvi, 163. $38.95 (cloth),
$16.95 (paper).
REVIEWED BY CHARLES GARDNER GEYH*

The extent to which the interdependence of the courts and Congress affects
how judges and legislators ought to interact is an issue that-until recently-has
been largely ignored. There is, of course, nothing new in the recognition that the
first and third branches are interdependent.
Despite the high school civics mantra that our government is comprised of
three separate and independent branches, the paradoxical interdependence of
these "independent" branches-brought about by a system of checks and
balances in which each branch possesses the means to make the others miserable if they get out of line-is widely understood. Thus, we all know that
legislators depend on judges to interpret the meaning of statutes and assess their
constitutionality, while judges depend on legislators for the resources needed to
perform their interpretive functions.
Far less appreciated is the inevitability, let alone the desirability, of less
formal interaction between the first and third branches in a constitutional
structure that makes each dependent on the other for its well-being. Until very
recently, few of the myriad treatises on the role of the United States courts in
American government addressed the role of judges and the judiciary in communicating with Congress on legislation regulating the judiciary and other matters. 1 To the extent that extrajudicial judge-legislator interaction was discussed
at all, it tended to be in the context of questioning whether such communications were consistent with the proscription on advisory opinions and the prevailing paradigm that judges and legislators should proceed separately, in what
2
Justice Cardozo disparagingly called "proud isolation."* Professor, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; Visiting Associate Professor,
Cleveland State University, Cleveland Marshall College of Law; J.D., 1983, B.A., 1980, University of
Wisconsin. Thanks to Neil Kinkopf and Emily Field Van Tassel for their comments on an earlier draft.
The author is a consultant to the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence.
I. See Charles Gardner Geyh, ParadiseLost, ParadigmFound: Redefining the Judiciary'sImperiled
Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1181 (1996) (surveying thirty treatises on the U.S. courts
and their role in the political process, and concluding that "the judiciary's extrajudicial role in statutory
reform was rarely addressed").
2. See id. at 1182-83; Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv.L, REv. 113, 114 (1921).
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Two notable exceptions are The Business of the Supreme Court, written by
Felix Frankfurter and James Landis in 1928, 3 and Peter Fish's self-described
update of Frankfurter and Landis in The Politicsof FederalJudicialAdministration, published in 1973. 4 In their history of the federal judiciary, Frankfurter and
Landis documented Congress's chronic failure to provide the lower courts with
timely relief from an ever-increasing caseload, despite perpetual importuning
from judges and Justices for additional appropriations, more judges, and structural changes in court organization and administration.5 Fish took up where
Frankfurter and Landis left off in 1928, providing a detailed account of the
judge-legislator interactions that culminated in numerous pieces of legislation
heralding the twentieth-century emergence of the judiciary as a bureaucratic
institution.6
Although Frankfurter and Landis and Fish described the extrajudicial interaction of judges and legislators, they made no effort to analyze the impact of such
interaction on the interdependent relationship between courts and Congress, or
to reconcile informal cooperation between judges and legislators with the
formal separation of powers. The time was right for a pioneer to explore this
uncharted terrain. That pioneer is Robert Katzmann.
In 1986, Professor Katzmann, then a fellow at the Brookings Institution,
hosted a groundbreaking colloquium on the relationship between courts and
Congress. Papers presented at the colloquium were edited by Professor Katzmann and later published in 1988 by the Brookings Institution, in Judges and
Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity.7 It was a remarkable compilation for
at least two reasons. First, Katzmann and the contributing authors directly
challenged the long prevailing view that the separation of powers and the need
to preserve judicial impartiality counseled judges and legislators to remain
unfamiliar, if not estranged, by highlighting the interdependent relationship
between courts and Congress, and the historical and contemporary importance
of extrajudicial interbranch communications to the health of that relationship.8
3. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928).
4. PETER FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JuDIctAL ADMINISTRATION (1973).

5. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 80-101 (discussing legislation introduced in
the 1870s "renewing in substance, the attempts for reorganization of the judiciary which had been
before Congress since the Civil War."). Despite "common consent" that "something had to be done,"
Frankfurter and Landis observed that "yet again it all ended in futility." Id. at 83. It was only after
"[t]he Supreme Court docket got beyond all control" in the late 1880s that sufficient pressure for
meaningful reform began to build. Id. at 86. "Bar and bench were again articulate," the authors noted,
"[E]ven members of the Supreme Court felt impelled to speak." Id. at 96. Finally, in 1891, Congress
provided a "decisive" remedy: legislation establishing the circuit courts of appeals. Id. at 101.
6. See, e.g., FISH, supra note 4, at 30-39, 125-65 (discussing judge and legislator communications
preceding passage of legislation establishing the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, the circuit
judicial councils, and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
7. JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TowARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMrrY (Robert Katzmann ed., 1988) [hereinafter JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS].

8. Professor Katzmann noted that "courts are reluctant to maintain a greater presence (in Congress)
because of the need to avoid prejudgment of issues that might come before them and because of the
constitutional barriers against rendering advisory opinions." Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying
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Second, Katzmann and company made a persuasive case that because judgelegislator communications had been largely ignored, the interbranch relationship had fallen into disrepair, and was in need of immediate attention. 9
In the wake of the Katzmann colloquium, new avenues of communication
between courts and Congress were constructed, and old ones repaved. Inter2
°
branch commissions were created,' articles written," and conferences held.'
An Office of Judicial Impact Assessment was established within the Administrative Office of United States Courts, 13 legislators increasingly acknowledged the
importance of unrestricted interbranch communication, 14 and Professor Katz-

Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 7. He nevertheless concluded that, while the
separation of powers concerns underlying the bar on advisory opinions "might mean that one branch
cannot encroach upon the functions unique to another or be made to assume tasks that diminish it
within the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that complete separation is required," because the
Constitution "created 'separate institutions sharing powers,' not separate institutions." Id. at 14.
Accordingly, "the separation of powers doctrine does not by itself compel such distance (between
judges and legislators)." Id. Professor Katzmann's views were echoed by other colloquium participants.
Judge Frank Coffin, quoting from Federalist No. 48, observed that "just as . . . the principle of
separation of powers 'does not require that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should
be wholly unconnected from each other,' so also we would say that the departments should, consistent
with their own mission, seek ways to communicate effectively with each other." Frank Coffin, The
Federalist No. 86:- On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS,
supra note 7, at 21, 26. Judge Irving Hill likewise second-guessed the "stiff-necked and absolutist
notion" that judges should not undertake nonjudicial functions. Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of
Proceedings, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS, supra note 7, at 162, 165 [hereinafter Katzmann, Summary].
9. "From the outset (of the colloquium) a consensus emerged that the judiciary and the Congress
often do not understand each other," and "do not know how to communicate with each other on some
of their most fundamental concerns." Katzmann, Summary, supra note 8, at 162. Professor Katzmann
described the consequences:
Current arrangements deprive Congress of the information needed to understand the capacity
and limitations of the courts.... Moreover, without interaction, Congress cannot make use of
judicial expertise when it revises laws....
Perhaps even more fundamentally, distance has fostered among some on Capitol Hill a
basic hostility toward the judiciary.
Id. at 10.
10. The Federal Courts Study Committee was established in 1988, see Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988), and the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in 1990, see Pub.
L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990).
11. Of the articles written, two of the best are: Shirley Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We
Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation,75 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1991);
and Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 Oo ST. L.J. 279
(1991). See also Geyh, supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Judyth W. Pendell, Foreword, 1991 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1
(introducing conference on mass-tort litigation attended by judges, practitioners, congressional staff and
academicians).
13. See generally, Nancy Potok, Development and Ongoing Operations, in CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., 1995)
(discussing the establishment of the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment).
14. See, e.g., Administration of the Fed. Judiciary: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property and JudicialAdmin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 106 (1991) (statement
of Subcommittee Chairman William J. Hughes) ("I do not subscribe to the old theory that there should
not be that communication to maintain the independence of the judiciary. I think, if anything, we need
to increase that communication so that we understand one another's problems.").
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mann himself spearheaded a project designed to improve the transmission of
judicial decisions to affected congressional committees. 15
Despite this flurry of activity, the interbranch relationship has taken a recent
turn for the worse. The majority whip in the United States House of Representatives recently announced that "[a]s part of our conservative efforts against
judicial activism, we are going after judges." 16 Fewer confirmations, more
impeachments and jurisdiction-stripping legislation are under active consideration. 1 7 Judges and legislators continue to snipe at each other over issues of
legislative drafting and statutory interpretation. 8 With regard to rules of court
practice and procedure, Congress has all but abandoned its longstanding deference to judicial self-regulation.' 9 As to court budget and administration, the
judiciary is increasingly viewed less as a co-equal branch of government with
common and honorable interests than as a bloated, and often wasteful agency in
need of close and skeptical oversight.2 ° Judges, for their part, have often reacted
to these developments defensively, accusing Congress of micromanaging their
affairs or threatening their independence, thereby causing further deterioration
to the interbranch relationship. 2 '
These are not random developments that have soured the relationship between the branches. Rather, they are animated by the shared view that each
branch of government is comprised of essentially self-interested actors who
keep each other from usurping control of government only through vigilant
exercise of the checks provided for in the Constitution.2 2
15. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challengefor Positive PoliticalTheory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 665-67 (1992).
16. Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans Out to Impeach "Activist" Jurists,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at
Al.
17. See id. See also AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 57 (1997) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT] (pointing to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 as recent examples of where the Congress has sought to
restrict the remedies, if not the subject matter jurisdiction, of the federal courts).
18. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 62-64 (1997) [hereinafter COURTS AND
CONGRESS].

19. See Linda Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politicsof
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991) (discussing recent politicization of procedural rulemaking);
Geyh supra note 1, at 1187-91 (same).
20. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that Congress "has begun to monitor all of
the judiciary's operations more closely than before," and has "scrutinized the judiciary's perceived
budgetary needs more closely, and sometimes skeptically, in the course of overseeing courthouse
construction projects, appropriating funds for judicial operations and enacting legislation to increase
judicial salaries, create new judgeships and regulate senior judge status.").
21. See id. at 46 ("Judges have not always responded constructively to [statutory] initiatives,
sometimes accusing. Congress of 'micromanaging' the courts or of threatening judicial independence.
That, in turn, has served only to deepen Congress' resolve to look at the courts even more closely,
which may ultimately inure to the detriment of the courts' institutional independence.").
22. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION (1995) (advocating need for Congress to be less deferential to the judiciary in light of the
judiciary's self-interested behavior); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the
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From this perspective, judges are less concerned about the public good than
they are about personal power, leisure, prestige and income. The quest for
power and the desire to impose their own value preferences on others leads
them to illegitimate "activist" decisionmaking that wrests control of government from the political branches; 23 the pursuit of income causes them to clamor
unjustifiably for pay increases; 24 the appetite for leisure prompts them to
second-guess legislation that adds to their caseload, and to lobby for additional
judges and appropriations;2 5 and the thirst for prestige leads them to insist upon
lavish courthouse furnishings and to complain about occupying their time with
routine drug cases. 26Frm
From ti
this perspective, if Congress is to perform its
constitutional duty to check the self-interested judicial branch, interbranch
combat is a necessary evil.
Re-enter Robert Katzmann with a message for the mongers of war between
the branches: give peace a chance. In Courts and Congress,27 Professor Katzmann re-examines the relationship between the two branches in light of recurrent tensions, and makes a powerful case for interbranch d6tente as the most
effective way to preserve the institutional prerogatives of courts and Congress.
In this essay, I begin by summarizing Professor Katzmann's latest work, in
which he seeks to promote a successful relationship between courts and Congress by identifying and perfecting the four "ingredients" essential to fostering
interbranch comity. Second, I suggest that if one accepts Professor Katzmann's
Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL SaTUD. 627 (1994) (describing self-interested judicial behavior in the
rulemaking process and encouraging greater skepticism of the judiciary's rulemaking).
23. After discussing a series of what the authors characterize as "activist decisions," Edwin Meese
and Rhett DeHart conclude that "It is not surprising, therefore, that many observers believe that such
activist judges have indeed brought about the despotic oligarchy against which Thomas Jefferson
warned." Edwin Meese Ill & Rhett DeHart, Reining in the Federal Judiciary, in MANDATE FOR
LEADERSHIP IV 245, 254 (Stuart M. Butler & Kim R. Holmes eds., 1997).
24. Testimony of John Yoo, Acting Professor of Law, Before the Commission on Separation of
Powers & Judicial Independence of the American Bar Association 5-6 (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Yoo Testimony] (dismissing the arguments of judges that regular cost of living
adjustments and increases in judicial salary are needed to preserve a strong and independent judiciary,
concluding that "[i]f financial considerations truly undermine the resoluteness of certain judges and
their feelings of security, we should ask ourselves whether we really want such individuals on the
bench-especially when the salary of a federal circuit judge is $141,700 a year, and that of a federal
district judge is $133,600 a year. That is a higher income than that received by almost all Americans. If
some judges are unhappy with their pay, I am sure that the President and the Senate can find able
lawyers who would be happy to trade jobs.").
25. See, e.g., Neil Lewis, Survey to Press U.S. Judges on Caseload and Expenses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1995, at A35 (discussing the judiciary's interest in filling court vacancies and Senator Grassley's
plan to circulate questionnaires to judges concerning their work habits in an effort to confirm his
suspicion that "judges probably are not working hard enough").
26. See, e.g., Investigation of the Fed. Courthouse Constr Program:Majority Staff Report of Senate
Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 103d Cong. 1, 31 (1994) (stating that "the increasing role of federal
judges in the design and construction of courthouses has resulted in unnecessary expenditures," and
that the judiciary's courthouse design guide, "more than anything else, has been used by judges to
justify lavish furnishings and costly changes").
27. COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra note 18.
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premise that a successful interbranch relationship is a harmonious relationship,
there may be additional ingredients requisite to a lasting peace between the
branches, that are worthy of inclusion on his list. Third, although I share
Professor Katzmann's premise that a successful interbranch relationship is a
restrained one, such a premise should not be posited as a given, in light of the
recent proliferation of interbranch skirmishes that some commentators, legislators and judges have openly encouraged. Accordingly, I argue that a case must
be made for interbranch restraint, not simply as a matter of mutable public
policy, but as a matter of enduring constitutional principle.
In the final analysis, Courts and Congress is an extraordinary achievement
that ought to be the starting point in the study of interbranch relations for years
to come. My proposed additions to and qualifications of Professor Katzmann's
work should therefore be understood not as backhanded criticism, but as the
next step toward developing a deeper understanding of an understudied field.
I. KATZMANN ON THE SUCCESSFUL INTERBRANCH RELATIONSHIP:
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

"Governance," Professor Katzmann observes at the outset of Courts and
Congress, "is premised on each institution's respect for and knowledge of the
others and on a continuing dialogue that produces shared understanding and
comity. ' ' 28 The challenge is to encourage shared understanding and comity in
the context (if not in the teeth) of a constitutional structure that generates
inevitable interbranch friction by making the first and third branches independent of, yet dependent upon, each other. Success, Professor Katzmann posits,
depends upon "at least four ingredients": (1) a "sensible way" to select judges;
(2) "proper attention" to the way which courts interpret statutes; (3) a means
"to transmit to Congress judicial opinions identifying perceived problems in
statutes"; and (4) a process of interbranch communication "to ensure both
branches'29 institutional well-being and the fair and efficient administration of
justice."
Katzmann then devotes the remainder of the work to a discussion of each of
these four "key ingredients." In his discussion of the first ingredient-judicial
selection-Katzmann chronicles the twentieth-century evolution of the appointments process, in which Senate confirmation hearings have become routine;
Senate scrutiny has intensified; media coverage has expanded; and interest
groups have begun seeking to influence senate confirmation votes indirectly
through appeals to the general public. One "common thread" throughout the
period, Professor Katzmann observes, is that senators have inquired into nominees' judicial, political and legal philosophies, and nominees have drawn lines,
albeit at different places, as to the questions they will answer. 30 This is as it
28. Id.at 1.
29. Id.at 4.
30. Id.at 19.
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should be, he concludes. Senators have the responsibility to satisfy themselves
that a nominee will be a good judge, which justifies inquiries into the nominee's
values, assumptions, temperament, intellect, and related matters. 3 1 By the same
token, would-be judges have the duty not to prejudge cases that they may have
32
to decide, and properly decline to answer questions that call on them to do so.
Katzmann concedes that occasional excesses are inevitable, in which senators
hinge their votes on the results of single-issue litmus tests the nominee refuses
to take, and offers "no panaceas," concluding that "much depends
upon the
33
willingness of political leaders to encourage a spirit of comity."
He ends his discussion of judicial selection with a series of simple recommendations-some shared by the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of
Federal Judges-to streamline the appointments process for lower court judges.34
Among other proposals, he advocates reducing redundancies in background
investigations, accelerating deadlines for identifying and confirming nominees,
and eliminating hearings in noncontroversial cases.35
His treatment of the second ingredient-statutory interpretation-begins with
an incisive summary and critique of the stunning range of competing interpretive approaches that have fought for supremacy in the last decade: William
Eskridge and Cass Sunstein's calls for revitalizing canons of construction; Hart
and Sack's public interest theory; Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein and
Jonathan Macey's disparate versions of public choice theory; positive political
theory as developed by an eclectic array of scholars in different disciplines;
Justice Scalia's textualist theory; and the "contextualist approach"-the name
Professor Katzmann assigns to the dominant approach employed by judges and
legislators.3 6 Consistent with his goal of promoting interbranch d6tente, he
ultimately sides with the contextualists, rejecting theories that disparage legislators or judges as nakedly self-interested, or that eschew legislative history as
hopelessly unreliable. It is the contextualists, after all, who respect Congress
enough to acknowledge that legislative history can provide a context in which
to understand statutory meaning, at the same time as they respect the judiciary
enough to acknowledge that judges have an independent role to play in the
interpretive process and should not blindly follow what is sometimes unreliable
legislative history.3 7

Quoting Judge Abner Mikva, Katzmann concludes that "the enemy is not
legislative records-only bad legislative records." 38 He thus offers three proposals to improve the communication of statutory meaning from Congress to
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 39-40.
Id. at 45.
See THE MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING FEDERAL
JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996).
35. See COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 36-43.

36. Id. at 49-64.
37. See id. at 62-64.
38. Id. at 64.
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courts: (1) improve legislative drafting by using guidebooks and checklists for
members of Congress and their staffs, and by enacting "default" positions, such
as a fall-back statute of limitations, that take effect when Congress neglects to
address a given issue in legislation it passes; (2) make legislative history more
reliable by having committee members sign committee reports, and floor managers designate particular floor statements or colloquies as authoritative; and (3)
devote greater attention to eliminating ambiguities through statutory revision.3 9
The third ingredient Professor Katzmann identifies-a means to transmit to
Congress judicial decisions identifying potential problems in statutes-is not so
much an independent ingredient as a combination of ingredients two (proper
statutory interpretation), and four (effective interbranch communication). Here
Professor Katzmann describes an ongoing "experiment" he is conducting, in
which circuit court opinions interpreting federal statutes are transmitted to the
legislative committee with jurisdiction over the statute at issue. Congress is thus
kept informed of how its statutes are being interpreted and is given an early
opportunity to fill gaps or clarify ambiguities.4 °
Professor Katzmann's discussion of the fourth ingredient-effective interbranch communication-offers a primer on the propriety of judge-legislator
interaction in its varied forms. Consistent with preceding chapters, there are no
strident conclusions here, no shalls or shall nots. He advocates a "presumption
in favor of expanding contact under appropriate conditions," which will "promot[e] not only the good faith upon which governance depends, but also the
effective workings of government the Founders envisioned."'' 4 He does not,
however, believe that specific guidelines can or should be developed to define
what "appropriate conditions" for interbranch contact are, because the propriety
and prudence of any given communication will depend on a range of variables,
such as the form of the communication, the substance of the message communicated, the circumstances surrounding the communication, the intentions and
expertise of the speaker, and how the communication is likely to be received by
its audience.4 2 Katzmann thus recommends that the branches expand avenues of
interbranch contact cautiously, weighing and monitoring the costs and benefits
of different types of communication on an ongoing, ad hoc basis.
Katzmann is a scholar who dares to be moderate. He uses no crisis rhetoric,
makes no radical proposals, and takes no potshots at public officials. He resists
such attention-grabbing gimmicks because they are antithetical to the essential
thrust of his message: that the complex business of governing remains a noble
calling ably pursued in the main by public-spirited women and men, who
usually do the right thing when they are adequately informed. He thus offers a
desperately needed counterpoint to the cynical public choice vision of gover-

39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 64-68.
Id. at 69-81.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 89-92.
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nance that has often dominated academic thinking and public opinion in the
aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate.
For those who write in the field, the value of Courts and Congress as a whole
exceeds the sum of its already valuable parts. Judicial appointments, statutory
interpretation, and interbranch communication are subjects that have traditionally received separate, disconnected treatment. By combining them as chapters
in a single volume, Professor Katzmann encourages the reader to start thinking
about the relationship between courts and Congress on a grander scale, in light
of the recurrent theme cutting across the chapters: that the first and third
branches ought to minimize friction between them and regulate each other in a
spirit of comity.
Following Professor Katzmann's lead yields two additional thoughts that
occupy the balance of this essay. First, if a peaceful and productive relationship
between courts and Congress is the dish we want to serve, more than four
ingredients may be required (a possibility that Professor Katzmann acknowledges 3)-so many more, that characterizing the relationship in terms of a
recipe comprised of "ingredients" may not fully capture the complexity of that
relationship, or position us to recommend adequate reforms. Second, in light of
recent interbranch altercations initiated and supported by some legislators,
judges and commentators, it may be unsafe to assume that interbranch harmony
is a universally accepted goal; hence, there is a need to develop more fully a
principled basis for defending an interbranch relationship founded upon mutual
understanding and deference.
II.

COMPLICATING THE SUCCESSFUL INTERBRANCH RELATIONSHIP:
SOME ADDED INGREDIENTS

The more time one spends thinking about the essentials of a healthy and
successful interbranch relationship, the more "ingredients" one can identify. A
fifth ingredient for good interbranch governance that might be added to the list
of four that Professor Katzmann discusses is an effective mechanism for judicial
discipline and removal. If the process by which judges are selected is an
essential component of the interbranch relationship, so too is the process by
which they are sanctioned and removed. The recent rediscovery of the impeachment threat as a means for Congress to influence judicial decisionmaking and
the controversy that it engendered, 44 underscores the relevance of judicial
removal and discipline to courts-Congress relations.
A sixth ingredient to consider is a satisfactory process for regulating court
practice and procedure. The regulation of court jurisdiction, appropriations and
administration, which Professor Katzmann discusses in his chapter on interbranch communication, is a matter of statutory reform, which casts the judiciary
and Congress in the respective roles of lobbyist and decisionmaker. Practice and
43. Professor Katzmann speaks in terms of "at least" four ingredients necessary for good interbranch governance. Id. at 4.
44. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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procedure, in contrast, more specifically, procedural rulemaking, is a codified
process that acknowledges the unique expertise of judges on the subject of court
procedure by casting the courts in a joint decisionmaking role with Congress,
which gives rise to a different interbranch dynamic with different stress points
deserving of separate treatment.45
A seventh ingredient for a successful relationship between courts and Congress is a process for effective interbranch communication between them and
the executive branch. Many of the concerns central to the judiciary in its
relationship with Congress can be profoundly affected by the President and
executive branch agencies. Thus (as Professor Katzmann notes), an effective
process for selecting judges turns in no small part on the President, who must
appreciate the need to make timely nominations to fill vacancies.46 An orderly
process for the interpretation of statutes may be undermined by an executive
branch unwilling to acquiesce to the statutory interpretations of lower courts
with which it disagrees. 47 Further, efforts to find solutions to the judiciary's
caseload burdens or budgetary needs through effective judicial-legislative communications may be frustrated by dramatic increases criminal prosecutions.4 8 In
short, a constructive relationship between the interdependent first and third
branches depends upon preserving an equally constructive relationship with the
equally interdependent second branch.
An eighth ingredient for good interbranch governance is an acceptable level
of public support for the judiciary. Members of Congress may be reticent to
approach the judiciary in the spirit of restraint and comity Professor Katzmann
advocates when their constituents are dissatisfied with and distrustful of the
court system. 49 With public confidence in the courts at low ebb, 50 an amicable
interbranch relationship may depend on restoring public faith in the courts
through improved communication and education.

45. See generally Geyh, supra note 1 (comparing and contrasting the judiciary's extrajudicial roles
in the legislative and rulemaking processes).
46. COURTS AND CONGRESS, supra note 18, at 37-38.
47. See, e.g., Dan Coenen, The ConstitutionalCase Against IntracircuitNonacquiescence, 75 MINN.
L. REv. 1339 (1991) (describing the nonacquiescence of executive branch agencies in circuit court
interpretations of statutes, and the impact of nonacquiescence on interbranch relations).
48. See Tracy Thompson, Stop Complaining, Stephens Tells Judges; Federal Jurists Bristle When
U.S. Attorney Suggests They Don't Work Very Hard, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at B1 (reporting on
altercation between U.S. Attorney and federal judges over Justice Department diversion of drug cases
into federal courts).
49. Thus, for example, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott characterized "federal judges that try to
run our schools, try to run our lives, try to make laws instead of interpret laws," as "some of the most
unpopular people in America." Senator Lott justified a closer, more skeptical examination of judicial
nominees and judgeship needs in light of public suspicion, concluding that "when I go home, nobody
says, 'Oh, please, give us some more federal judges.' A lot of them say, 'These people are out of control
and they are going beyond what the Constitution intended.' " Briefing With Senator Trent Lott, FED.
NEWS SERV., Sept. 16, 1997, at 5.
50. See ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 59-61 (citing polling data for the proposition that "[p]ublic
confidence in the judiciary-at both the federal and state level-is perceived by many to be in a
dangerous state of decline").
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A ninth ingredient is the maintenance of a constructive working relationship
by the judiciary and Congress with court interest groups. Several of the most
significant altercations between courts and Congress that have occurred in
recent years were precipitated by private groups who use or otherwise have an
interest in the courts. Thus, for example, fireworks between judges and legislators over the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 were sparked by a report
prepared by the private organization Foundation for Change, in conjunction
with the Brookings Institution; 5 recurrent squabbles between courts and Congress as to who retains primary rulemaking authority have been attributed to
court user groups that have petitioned Congress for rule changes after their
efforts to influence the Judicial Conference have failed; 52 and interbranch
friction over the appointment or impeachment of "activist" judges has been
catalyzed, or at least exacerbated, by private groups such as the Free Congress
Foundation.5 3
There are undoubtedly other "ingredients" as well, 54 and Professor Katzmann should not be expected to have listed them all. To the contrary, I am
unconvinced that a complete list can be assembled. The courts-Congress relationship is ultimately less like a cake comprised of a fixed number of ingredients in
specified amounts, than a complex ecosystem with innumerable and changing
components, in which changes in one part of the system will precipitate changes
in other parts, and eventually the system as a whole. Thus, for example,
disagreement between the branches over issues of statutory or constitutional
construction (ingredient two), can lead to accusations of "judicial activism" by
legislators and disgruntled court interest groups (ingredient nine) that sour the
interbranch relationship and impair effective interbranch communication (ingredient four), catalyze congressional efforts to weed out "activist" judges in the
confirmation process (ingredient one), cause the President to alter his relations
with Congress as it affects judicial nominations (ingredient seven) and encourage some members of Congress to bring the impeachment process to bear
against "activist" jurists (ingredient five), all to the detriment of public confidence in the courts (ingredient eight).

51. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity as a Means of Reducing JudicialDecision-Making
Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 511, 528-30 (1993) (describing the development of the Civil Justice
Reform Act and the Judiciary's negative response).
52. See Geyh, supra note 1, at 1211-14.
53. See Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut:JudicialAttacks Push Debate to Right, Put Hatch
in Middle, 83 A.B.A. J. 32 (June 1997) (discussing impact of Free Congress Foundation on judicial
confirmation debate).
54. Two additional possibilities come to mind: an effective intrabranch command structure within
the first and third branches, to minimize "unauthorized," or at least ill-advised interactions between
judges and legislatures that can generate unnecessary friction; and a mechanism for communication
between the state and federal systems to address the federalism concerns that can drive a wedge
between courts and Congress, for example, when Congress seeks to federalize causes of action
traditionally litigated in the state courts.
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Likening the points of interaction between courts and Congress to an ecosystem may also aid in illuminating the path to reform. As illustrated in the
preceding paragraph, subtle changes in one component of the courts-Congress
relationship may have a ripple effect throughout other components of that
relationship. What this suggests, however, is that piecemeal reforms seeking to
remedy isolated components of the courts-Congress relationship-be it the
appointments process, the process of statutory interpretation, or interbranch
communication-will inevitably yield disappointing or unintended results to the
extent that they are not considered in the context of the relationship as a whole.
In addition, then, to the particular reforms that Professor Katzmann proposes,
I would suggest that we begin to explore ways in which such reforms can be
considered in broader context. The private sector has recently initiated two such
efforts. First, The American Judicature Society has recently established a Center
for Judicial Independence to explore a range of issues affecting the health and
well-being of an independent judiciary. 55 Second, Citizens for Independent
Courts-a bipartisan coalition of organizations and individuals spearheaded by
the Twentieth Century Fund-has undertaken a major campaign in opposition to
recent attacks on judges and the judiciary.56 Issues within the scope of the
coalition effort include: the appointments and impeachments processes, jurisdiction-stripping legislation, judicial criticism, and congressional micromanagement of court operations.57 With respect to the public sector, one possibility that
I have advocated elsewhere, is to establish a permanent, Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary, comprised of representatives from all
three branches of government, that would assist Congress by evaluating a wide
variety of legislative proposals and other reforms affecting the federal courts.58
The common focus of these private and public sector efforts is to create fora in
which the relationship between courts and Congress can be evaluated systematically-consistent with the characterization of that relationship in terms of a
complex system.
Quibbles as to the pithiest metaphor for the judge-legislator relationship
should not detract from what Professor Katzmann has achieved in Courts and
Congress, which is to take a crucial first step in the direction of describing a
delicate, complicated and heretofore neglected interrelationship. The four components of the interrelationship that he highlights may not be the only components, but they are certainly the most important. Moreover, as discussed below,
cataloguing the comprehensive array of factors relevant to effective courtsCongress interaction is ultimately less critical than developing a better understanding of and justification for the themes unifying those factors.

55. See Center for Judicial Independence, American Judicature Society (undated) (on file with
author).
56. Citizens for Independent Courts, Mission Statement (on file with author).
57. Id.
58. See Geyh, supra note 1, at 1234-40.
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III.

SIMPLIFYING THE SUCCESSFUL INTERBRANCH RELATIONSHIP:
THE SEARCH FOR AND DEFENSE OF UNIFYING THEMES

Each of the nine ingredients or components of a successful interbranch
relationship that Professor Katzmann and I have listed share a common assumption that a successful relationship is a restrained relationship. Accordingly, the
list identifies the points at which interbranch interaction occurs and the people
who are in a position to affect the nature of that interaction, to the end of
maximizing interbranch comity and minimizing interbranch friction. This unifying theme-that interbranch restraint, comity, and mutual understanding are
pivotal to the success of courts-Congress relations, and should be pursued by all
participants in and at all stages of interbranch governance-may seem so benign
as to require no defense, and Professor Katzmann offers none to speak of,
except to say that it is what the Framers intended.5 9
As previously discussed, however, a competing vision of the interbranch
relationship has recently re-emerged, which its proponents likewise believe is
what the Framers intended-a vision premised upon the assumption that courts
and Congress are nakedly self-interested institutions that can be controlled only
through vigorous exercise of whatever interbranch checks the Constitution
tolerates. 60 For those who adhere to this view, it makes no sense to say that
Congress should-in the name of comity and respect for the judiciary's institutional and decisional independence-refrain from doing what the Constitution
empowers it to do.6 '

Those who share Professor Katzmann's vision of the interbranch relationship
must be prepared to take up where he leaves off. They must defend a relationship premised on the politics of comity and restraint, premises that stand in
opposition to those grounded in the politics of conflict and mutual distrust.
The assignment is more difficult than it may first appear. The Constitution

59. See COURTS

AND CONGRESS,

supra note 18, at 1:

The Founders envisioned that constructive tension among those governmental institutions
would not only preserve liberty but would also promote the public good. No branch was to
encroach upon the prerogatives of the others, yet in some sense each was dependent upon the
others for its sustenance and vitality. And that interdependence would contribute to an
informed and deliberative process. Governance, then, is premised on each institution's respect
for and knowledge of the others and on a continuing dialogue that produces shared understanding and comity.
60. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
61. See ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 28 (quoting Thomas Jipping of the Free Congress
Foundation, as testifying that "establishing, creating, abolishing judgeships, reallocation of judicial
resources, the kinds of things the Constitution gives Congress the authority to do" should not be
characterized as threats to judicial independence because then, "perfectly legitimate things that
coordinate branches of government may legitimately do under the Constitution are then defined to be a
threat to what another coordinate branch does, and that creates a kind of internal conflict that I don't
think makes any sense."); see also Yoo Testimony, supra note 24, at 6 ("One other proposal bandied
about is... to oppose congressional 'micromanagement' of the federal Judiciary. It is at times hard for
me to understand exactly what this problem is and what should be done about it. Certainly, as a
Constitutional matter, there are few limits on Congress's ability to regulate the federal courts.").
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nowhere declares that the first and third branches should "play well with
others," and no court decision requires it. Notwithstanding the absence of a
constitutional edict, the interbranch relationship is steeped in a rich tradition of
mutual deference and respect. Congress has never impeached and removed a
judge from office for making an unpopular decision.62 It has cooperated with
the judiciary in establishing an independent judicial branch, by creating the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, and the Federal Judicial Center, and by delegating to the
courts the power to promulgate its own rules of practice and procedure.6 3 It has
rarely altered federal court jurisdiction or adjusted court size as a means to
manipulate judicial decisionmaking. 64
The easiest explanation for this tradition is simply that the branches have
restrained themselves because they have realized that it is good public policy to
do so. If, however, arguments for and against interbranch restraint are confined
to the public policy arena, changing perceptions of wise policy can quickly give
way to fundamental changes in the traditionally restrained interbranch relationship.
Thus, for example, Professor John Yoo, former Chief Counsel to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, has argued that because interbranch restraint is solely a
matter of public policy and not constitutional necessity, Congress is free to
change course whenever it chooses:
Congress enjoys a broad discretion to structure the federal courts as it sees fit.
In fact, Congress has been quite generous in affording the federal courts the
broad policy-making role that they currently possess-but it should be kept in
mind that it is up to Congress as a final matter to decide how many federal
courts and
judges the nation will have, and what jurisdiction they will
65
exercise.

In Yoo's view, if Congress changes its mind tomorrow and decides that it is a
good idea to micromanage the courts, strip their jurisdiction, adjust their
remedial authority, eliminate judgeships, or return control of the judiciary's
budget to the executive department, then "that is its right."' 66 In a similar vein,
then-Congressman Gerald Ford, and more recently House Majority Whip Thomas DeLay have argued that Congress's traditional reticence to impeach and
remove judges for unpopular decisions is neither here nor there because Congress is within its rights to define "high crimes and misdemeanors" however it
62. See WILuAM REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 114 (1992) ("The acquittal of Samuel Chase by the
Senate had a profound affect on the American Judiciary.... [B]y assuring that impeachment would not
be used in the future as a method to remove members of the Supreme Court for their judicial opinions,
it helped to safeguard the independence of that body.").
63. See Geyh, supra note 1, at 1172-78, 1185-87.
64. See ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 46 (quoting Dean Peter Shane).
65. Yoo Testimony, supra note 24, at 6-7.
66. Id. at 7.
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chooses, and to change that definition whenever public policy warrants. 67
In short, if we characterize decisions of this sort as presenting questions of
public policy only, there is nothing irresponsible, let alone unconstitutional,
about Congress aborting its longstanding commitment to interbranch deference
and an independent, self-regulating judicial branch. As long as Congress respects Article III restrictions on judicial tenure, salary, and the exercise of
judicial power (as construed by the courts), it is Congress's right and duty to
change public policy freely to meet changing needs.
All of which begs the question: do congressional decisions of this sort only
present questions of public policy? I think not. When Congress interprets and
exercises its power to confirm judicial nominees, to impeach federal judges, or
to establish (and, with the help of the necessary and proper clause, regulate) the
lower federal courts, Congress is not merely making public policy; it is implementing constitutional policy, if not law as well. Implementing constitutional
policy involves more than determining whether a proposed piece of legislation
or other measure will yield intended benefits; it also involves determining
whether the proposed action is consistent with the Constitution and the governmental structure it embraces.
Even when Congress is engaged in conventional (as opposed to constitutional) policymaking, it will assess whether a proposed enactment is constitutional, if only to avoid wasting its time processing legislation that the courts will
later invalidate.6 8 In such situations, however, it is the courts that are the
constitutional interpreters of primary and final resort, for it is their prior
opinions that Congress often looks to for guidance during the legislative
process, and it is the courts that ultimately decide whether Congress got it
right.6 9 When Congress is engaged in constitutional policymaking, on the other
hand, Congress-not the judiciary-assumes the primary, and sometimes the
exclusive interpretive role.
When the constitutional questions at issue are "political" ones, as is presum-

67. 116 CONG. REc. 11,913 (April 15, 1970) (statement of Representative Gerald Ford) ("[A]n
impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given
moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses [the Senate] considers to be
sufficiently serious to require removal."); Morning Edition Transcript # 97092615-210 (National
Public Radio, Sept. 26, 1997) (quoting Tom DeLay as saying that "When is impeachment a legitimate
tool? Can Congress impeach a public official for non-criminal acts? I think the answer is yes. Anyone
can be impeached that has the majority of the House and. . . [can be] removed from office with
two-thirds vote from the Senate.").
68. For an exchange of views on how well Congress interprets the Constitution in situations where
the courts remain the interpreters of primary and final resort, see Abner Mikva, How Well Does
Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretationby Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985).
69. This is not to denigrate the importance of Congress's interpretive role in this context, nor is it to
deny that Congress's role is, in some sense, independent of the courts' role. Id. My point is simply to
say that in such situations, the buck ultimately stops with the Court, not Congress, for which reason the
focus of attention within and without Congress understandably remains on the judiciary's constitutional
interpretation.
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ably the case with the definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors," or the
grounds upon which the Senate may legitimately withhold its "consent" to a
presidential nominee, Congress is the exclusive interpreter.7 ° When it comes to
legislation establishing and regulating the lower federal courts, the judiciary
retains an interpretive role to ensure that the terms of Article III have not been
Congress has "broad discretion to
violated, but as Professor Yoo rightly notes,
71
fit."
sees
it
as
courts
federal
the
structure
When Congress enacts legislation establishing and regulating the federal
courts, in what Gerhard Casper calls "framework legislation, ' 72 it is fulfilling
its primary-though not exclusive-responsibility to interpret and implement
Article III. In essence, the "broad discretion" that the Constitution delegates to
Congress to oversee the federal courts, makes questions concerning court size,
jurisdiction, administration and structure, functionally quasi-political in nature.
Although the Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the congressional actions in question (as it will not with questions explicitly denominated
as "political"), in doing so it has repeatedly and emphatically deferred to
Congress's plenary power to regulate lower court operations.73 Accordingly,
constitutional issues such as whether it would be consistent with the Framers'
vision of separated, interdependent, powers in a federal system of government
to establish federal trial or circuit courts, to "pack" the Supreme Court, to
establish a bureaucratically centralized Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, or to delegate rulemaking responsibility to the judiciary, are ones
largely within Congress's discretion to answer.
Congress, then, has the primary and sometimes exclusive responsibility to
interpret and implement the Constitution as it relates to the composition,
structure and operation of the federal courts. To say that Congress has the
"right" to reject judicial nominees or to impeach federal judges for any reason
at all, or to structure the courts as it sees fit simply because no court will stand
70. See, e.g., Michael Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability:Judicial Review of Impeachments
After Nixon, 144 DUKE L.J. 231 (1994) (defending nonreviewability of impeachments decisions as
political questions); Mark V. Tushnet, Principles,Politics,and ConstitutionalLaw, 88 MICH. L. REv. 49
(1989) (arguing that the appointments clause is best characterized as giving rise to political questions).
71. Yoo Testimony, supra note 24, at 6-7.
72. Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 281, 282 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); see also Gerhard Casper, Constitutional
Constraintson the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
463, 482 (1976).
73. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) ("Article I, § 8, cl. 9 authorizes Congress to
establish the lower federal courts. From almost the founding days of the country it has been firmly
established that Congress acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws necessary and proper to their
establishment may also enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts"); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 9 (1940) ("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal
courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules
not inconsistent with the Statutes or Constitution"); The Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S.
51, 53 (1825) ("It cannot certainly be contended, with the least color of plausibility, that Congress does
not possess the uncontrolled power to legislate with respect to the form and effect of executions issued
upon judgments recovered in the courts of the United States.").
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in the way may therefore technically be true but is utterly irresponsible. It is
akin to saying that the Supreme Court has the "right" to interpret the Constitution in completely preposterous ways for no better reason than because it can.
When the Framers of the United States Constitution delegated to Congress
the task of implementing the constitutional structure, they clearly did not regard
that delegation as a license to behave irresponsibly. The delegates to the
constitutional convention left gaps in the governmental framework, none larger
than that relating to establishment of inferior courts.7 4 The gap was a conscious

one, created by the convention's inability to reach agreement as to the need for
and desirability of federal trial courts. 75 The resulting compromise delegated to
Congress the responsibility to establish (and, by implication, regulate, disestablish, or not establish at all) the lower federal courts.76 The point of giving

Congress such power was not to counteract judicial ambition by making the
survival of the third branch dependent upon the whim and caprice of the first.
The point was to entrust to Congress the task of perfecting the constitutional
framework. 77

Consistent with the Framers' desires, Congress has traditionally taken its role
as interpreter and implementer of the Constitution quite seriously. In the debates
preceding passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, support for establishing federal
trial courts was grounded in the argument that they were indispensable to
fulfilling the Framers' vision of the judiciary's role in the fledgling, tripartite
government. 78 Legislation to establish a circuit court of appeals system a
century later was likewise defended by sponsors in terms of its consistency with
the Framers' intentions to delegate to Congress the responsibility for ensuring
that the judicial branch would endure. 79 Similarly, members of Congress justified 1934 legislation delegating to the judiciary primary responsibility for
74. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Originsand History of FederalJudicial Independence, in ABA
supra note 17, at 72-74.
75. See id. at 72-73.
76. See id. at 72.
77. Explanations for the clause in the ratification debates thus focused on the need for flexibility in
molding the contours of the federal judiciary to meet changing needs. See id. at 77.
78. See II DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1386 (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1992) (quoting Representative Gerry as saying that "We are
to administer this Constitution and therefore we are bound to establish these courts"); id. at 1368
(quoting Representative Benson that "It is not left to the election of the legislature of the United States
whether to adopt or not, a judicial system like the one before us; the words of the constitution are plain
and full and must be carried into operation"); id. at 1359 (quoting Representative Madison that "In the
new Constitution a regular system is provided. The legislative power is made effective for its objects;
the executive is co-extensive with the legislature, and it is equally proper that this should be the case
with the judiciary.").
79. 21 CONG. REC. 3403-04 (1891) (statement of Representative Culbertson) ("The prophetic
wisdom of the illustrious statesmen who framed the constitution is nowhere more clearly shown than in
the organic provisions upon which the Federal judicial system should be constructed by Congress ....
Congress . . . has the authority to advance the judicial system of the United States . . . and it is the
unquestioned duty of Congress to provide the necessary courts and judicial force to meet the increased
demands of the country upon the judiciary. The framers of the Constitution did not construct it for their
day and time, but for all time.").
REPORT,
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procedural rulemaking, and 1939 legislation transferring financial control of the
judiciary from the Justice Department to an Administrative Office of United
States Courts, in terms of separation of powers principles and the sponsors'
desire to restructure the relationship between Congress and the courts so as to
preserve and protect the "true balance" between them.8 °
Members of Congress have likewise used their constitutional interpretations
as a form of precedent to influence, if not control, subsequent interpretations.
Thus, the Senate's 1805 decision not to remove Justice Samuel Chase from
office for an unpopular, high-handed decision, on the grounds that such behavior did not rise to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor, has been cited as
precedent in subsequent impeachment proceedings for similar propositions. In
congressional hearings culminating in rejection of President Franklin Roosevelt's
"court packing plan," opponents argued that while packing the Court with new
Roosevelt appointees as a means to manipulate future Court decisions may
technically be constitutional, such manipulation ran counter to longstanding
congressional precedent, and hence violated the spirit of judicial independence
imbedded in the Constitution. 81 And in the course of Senate confirmation
proceedings on the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork, Judiciary
Committee Chairman Joseph Biden and Senator Orrin Hatch debated the propriety of rejecting nominees because of their "political philosophy," and did so
with explicit and elaborate reference to both the Founders' intentions and

80. With respect to the Rules Enabling Act, one committee report supporting the bill complained that
"the trouble with the procedure of the courts is due to the fact that coordination between these two
departments of government has been destroyed by exclusive legislative control." S. REP. No. 69-1174
(1926). Another added that the Act was "a belated recognition of the true balance between the
legislative and judicial departments; a tardy correction of a situation that would not be tolerated in the
reverse." S. REP. No. 70-440, at 9 (1928) (minority views).
With respect to the Administrative Office Act, hearings on the bill reflected the legislators' intentions
to perfect the framers' desire for an independent judiciary:
Senator Mahoney: The administrative office of the judiciary would be, in effect the budget
office for the whole judicial system, and would make its report direct to Congress, which
thereupon would reject or approve the recommendations?
Attorney General Cummings: Absolutely ....
Senator Hatch: It takes it out of the hands of the Justice Department and places it in the hands
of the administrative office.
Senator Mahoney: This upon the theory that the courts are ai independent branch of
government, and should be.
Senator Norris: Yes.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
U.S. Senate, 75th Cong. 10-11 (1938).
81. See, e.g., Reorganizationof the Fed. Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 75th Cong. 760-67 (1937) (statement of Erwin Griswold) (arguing that
there are no "precedents" for Congress influencing judicial decisionmaking through manipulation of
court size and that "there is an importance in traditional restraints," that the government ought to
respect, regardless of whether the plan is technically constitutional); id. at 539, 546 (statement of
Raymond Moley) (arguing that the court packing proposal is unprecedented and not in keeping with the
traditions of interbranch restraint, which the branches ought to respect as a matter of constitutional
principle).
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"precedents" established in subsequent confirmation proceedings. 82
Returning to the case for interbranch restraint, the spirit of deference and
comity that has dominated the relationship between courts and Congress over
time, is more than good public policy. It is constitutional policy embedded in
longstanding congressional precedent. Moreover, such precedent is not just a
preliminary interpretation that the courts are free to countermand; it is the final
word on questions that the Constitution delegates to Congress to decide.
Constitutional precedent can, of course, be overturned. Congress possesses
the constitutional authority to "overturn" its commitment to interbranch restraint tomorrow, just as the Supreme Court possesses the authority to overturn
Brown v. Board of Education.8 3 Yet in both cases, because we are talking about
overturning constitutional precedent, there are additional concerns associated
with reversing course that are inapplicable to simple changes in public policy.
For one, abrupt changes in Congress's interpretation and implementation of
an otherwise unchanged Constitution undermine the legitimacy of Congress as a
constitutional interpreter. Thus, when legislators threaten to depart from longestablished, congressionally-developed constitutional norms-for example by
initiating impeachment proceedings against judges who render unpopular decisions or by sand-bagging the confirmations of "activist" lower court nomineessuch departures are inevitably attributed to illegitimate, partisan gamesmanship.
Second, such changes disrupt the settled expectations of the judiciary, which
structures its affairs in reliance upon a comparatively stable set of precedents
that Congress establishes over time. Thus, when Congress shows signs of
departing from its longstanding deferential posture and commitment to an
independent, self-regulating judicial branch, by second-guessing the judiciary's
resource requirements, judgeship needs, caseload burden, courthouse construction plans, internally generated rules of practice and procedure, and so forth, it
destabilizes the rulemaking process, the judiciary's role in legislation affecting
the courts, and the relationship between judges and legislators.
This is not to suggest that concern for Congress's legitimacy as a constitutional policymaker or the judiciary's settled expectations demand slavish obedience to congressionally generated constitutional precedent. It does suggest,
however, that before departing from longstanding precedent, Congress ought to
balance the need for and benefits of doing so against the costs to its own
legitimacy and to the stability of both the judiciary and the courts-Congress
relationship.
Congress has long taken its role as interpreter and implementer of the
Constitution seriously. The time has come to openly acknowledge that it does
so. The time has come to develop a general theory of congressional constitutionalism, to structure and stabilize congressional constitutional precedent. When

82. 133 CONG. REc. 20, 908-15 (July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Biden); 133 CONG. REc. 21,
691-98 (July 30, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
83. 344 U.S. 141 (1952).
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Congress's role in this regard is more fully understood and appreciated, it
should become apparent that the spirit of comity, restraint and interbranch
deference Professor Katzmann advocates, is more than good policy that Congress is free to take or leave at the drop of a hat. It is a matter of constitutional
principle established by longstanding congressional precedent that ought to be
as much a part of our constitutional understanding as the landmark cases of the
United States Supreme Court. In closing, I can not improve upon the long
forgotten testimony of Raymond Moley, the editor of Newsweek and a professor
of Public Law at Columbia University, who appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee over sixty years ago, in opposition to President Roosevelt's
court packing plan:
[A] deliberate attempt by one branch of the Government to weaken another
branch has very few parallels in our history. And none of them is creditable ....

That way has always been open to the purposes of any dominant Executive
and congressional majority. But the very fact that it has not been employed,
except in one or two cases of which we are not very proud, has established an
inhibition upon the use of this method-an inhibition based upon custom and
tradition. In other words, a custom has been established that fundamental
changes should not be so attained-a custom of the Constitution, or a doctrine
of political stare decisis, if you will, which is as binding upon public officials
as a written provision of the Constitution itself.... The maintenance of the

custom of the Constitution is essential to the preservation of a stable Government under which people are able to plan their lives and direct their actions. It
and
is true that the custom of the Constitution changes, but it changes slowly
84

its existence is an indispensable element in a democratic government.
CONCLUSION

In Courts and Congress, Professor Katzmann reaffirms his pre-eminence in
the field of interbranch governmental relations. His prescription for promoting
cooperative and productive interaction between judges and legislators offers a
powerful antidote to the prevailing cynicism that has dominated much of
academic and public opinion. There remains more to be done. The essential
elements of a harmonious relationship between courts and Congress warrant
further study, and the premise that friction between the branches ought to be
minimized is one that calls for a more fully developed constitutional foundation.
But that should not diminish appreciation for Courts and Congress; to the
contrary, it deserves recognition as a milestone in courts-Congress scholarship
that will serve as the starting point for related work years into the future.

84. Reorganizing the Fed. Judiciary:Hearingson S. 1392 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
U.S. Senate, 75th Cong. 539 (1937) (statement of Raymond Moley).

